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IN V ESTING  IN OLIR FU TURE: M OBILISING R E S O U R C E S  N O W
By R eginald H e rb o ld  G re e n
Probable possible my black hen 
She lays eggs in the relative when 
She doesn't lay eggs in the positive now 
Because she's unable to  postulate how,
- Anon
Even the longest journey 
Begins with the first step.
- Confucius
N o t  W h e t h e r  B u t  H o w
W ithout additional resource allocations, as well as efficiency in their utilisation, global and 
national goals for children will be met, at the best, partially and slowly. N ow here is that more 
true than in most o f  Africa, just as it is true that nowhere is it harder to identify and to 
mobilise additional resources public or private, domestic or external, from additions or 
reallocations/savings.
Like the goals, the resource mobilisation needs to  be cumulative, establishing a positive 
dynamic and building on and from its own success. In a few countries such a dynamic exists, 
but in m ost per capita allocations to  key child oriented programmes (total as well as state) are 
stagnant or declining. Overall 1980-95 has seen a 40%  to  50% fall in per capita African 
governm ent delivery o f  basic services.
W hile financing attainm ent o f  national child priority plans can be - indeed needs to  be - 
separated from overall budgeting for some purposes, it cannot be taken wholly out o f  that 
context. A healthy, well fed, decently clad, educate child in an enabling hom e environm ent is 
an unattainable goal if that home is a family in abso me poverty. So too a well funded.
effective child priority program m e in the context o f  a near bankrupt governm ent with no basic 
services-safety net-production by poor people strategic priority is not possible.
A Universal Access to Basic Services, Safety Net Access Provision, Production by Poor 
People strategy is the environment in which a national child goal program m e can be most 
effective. The expenditure priorities are overlapping and complementary but not identical
U A B S includes primary health services, primary education; access to nearby pure water, 
nutrition and environm ental sanitation. H ow ever it also includes basic production extension 
services (especially in agriculture), household w ater for crops and animals and basic law and 
o rder (constables and magistrates). Because without these household incomes and therefore 
children's welfare will be gravely prejudiced these are important to, even if not part of, 
achieving children's program m e goals.
Safety Net Access Provision is designed to  reach poor households - and therefore poor 
children w ho are a majority o f  their members. The broadest program mes seek to  alleviate 
present m isery and avert permanent loss o f  ability to  produce initiated by natural disaster or 
m anm ade calamity afflicted households. They turn primarily on w ork for food, food for work 
and food  ration distribution. A parallel strand relates to  households with the structural 
problem  o f  too  few able bodied pairs o f  hands to  earn relative to  m ouths to  feed. These 
program m es reach primarily female headed households with children (indeed the largest in 
urban M ozam bique uses mother and child clinic referrals as its basic identification system) and 
secondarily  handicapped or aged headed households with grandm others a majority in the latter 
g roup  as seen in the Namibia, South Africa, and in forecasts for the newly announced 
B otsw ana, Old Age Pension schemes.
Production by Poor People includes access to  physical infrastructure (e.g. roads), market 
in frastructu re  (e.g. knowledge and reasonably com petitive buyers and sellers), skills (e.g. 
extension services, training) and physical assets (e.g. land, credit). Quite apart from its 
centrality  to  rapid m acroeconom ic (including fiscal and export revenue) growth, PPP feeds 
d irectly  into poor household and child welfare most notably in respect to  food, clothing,
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shelter and environmental sanitation. In some cases it needs to extend to  environmental 
protection: need making soil and tree mining necessary to survive now  erodes children's life 
tim e income prospects and a fortiori those o f  their children
U A BS-SN A P-PPP has clear child and gender aspects. Universal access disproportionately 
benefits those previously excluded. This is true in respect to PPP because the 25%  o f  
households now  typically female headed have been nearly invisible to  such program m es in the 
past. M ore specific interactions exist in some cases. The Iringa model nutrition program me 
(see Panel) is grounded on village level wom en's groups and both facilitates and encourages 
them  to build related priorities around the child feeding core. In a plurality o f  cases these have 
included enhancem ent o f  wom en' earning activities. Facilitated by the integral involvement o f 
Agricultural Extension in the nutrition aspects this aspect o f  PPP directly benefits children 
because they play a larger role in the expenditure side o f  women's than o f  men's largely 
separate budgets even in com plete households.
1 9 9 5  -  T h e  S t a r t i n g  P o i n t
The first half o f  the 1990s have not been a period o f  econom ic success for Africa. The feeble 
recovery o f  the second half o f  the 1980s has flickered out in the w inds o f  term s o f  trade 
decline, radical declines in net transfers (especially program m e and project aid dow n nearly 
50%  per capita once emergency and expatriate salary aid are stripped out), continuing debt 
overhang, delayed public service/services reform and (albeit with a decline from 1992 on) war. 
C ountry experience has varied with a fair number o f  4%  annual grow th  rates, but few much 
higher, and a pluralit with plus 2%  to minus 2%  trends.
National child plans in response to  the W orld Summit on Children's goals have increased 
prioritisation o f  certain health, education and w ater activities but w ithin a w orsening context.
The bleak averages mask substantial variation in statistical and (probably to  a lesser extent) 
actual realities. Per capita GDP in Algeria, Botswana, M auritius, Seychelles and South Africa 
is over $2,000 while in Ethiopia, M ozam bique and Tanzania it is said to  be under $100. The
3
share o f  governm ent spending to the economy is over 50% in some cases - e.g. M ozam bique - 
and under 10% in others - e.g. Somalia. The share o f  health and education in governm ent 
spending is over 25%  in Ghana, Namibia, Swaziland - and in many m ore countries if  debt 
service is excluded - but under 10% in Guinea-Bissau and Angola. W ithin education primary's 
share exceeds 60%  in Kenya but is barely a quarter in Ghana, C ote d'Ivoire, Guinea and 
Uganda.
D o m e s t i c  F i n a n c i n g  -  S o m e  O p t i o n s
In the long term sustainable increases in specifically child centred and broader UABS- 
SN A P-PPP strategic program m es must be primarily domestically financed Further they 
m ust be financed primarily out o f  economic growth. W ith 4% GDP grow th - the W orld 
B ank's target - both fiscal receipts and household resources available for user fees would 
probably rise 6%. At the more optimistic OA U /ECA /U N  target o f  6%  G D P grow th, 8%  to 
9% fiscal revenue grow th might reasonably be anticipated.
These g row th  generated resources have a substantial advantage in term s o f  reallocation - 
balancing up in respect to  new priorities is much easier technically, operationally and 
politically in term s o f  concentrating new rather than o f  cutting existing allocations.
D o m e s t i c  R e s o u r c e  R e a l l o c a t i o n  -  P o t e n t i a l s  a n d  L i m i t s
R eallocation o f  existing domestic resources has distinct limits though in some cases substantial 
potential. The largest - but most unevenly distributed - source is defence budget cuts as part 
o f  a peace dividend
The outstand ing  achievers - at least at points in time when structural transfers to  augment 
social services w ere feasible - have been Namibia and Ethiopia. E thiopia (see panel) cut 
defence expenditure from  13% to 3% o f  G D P over 1992-1995. That financed the initial phase 
o f  public service reform  (focused on primary education and health) and o f  decentralisation.
The problem  is that this source o f  reallocation is virtually exhausted, com plem entary resources 
in health, education and - especially - w ater and environment are too  low and universal access
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at prim ary service level is barely over a third achieved. Independent Namibia over 1990-1993 
cut the proportion o f  spending on defence and security by over half with a parallel increase o f 
about the sam e proportion to community and social services - especially prim ary education, 
health care and small farming household extension and livelihood developm ent services.
[Richard - Y our figures o f  11% and 5% are said to be budget. Are you sure they weren't 
GDP? H ow ever, no great m atter by now ]
Tanzania and M ozam bique have reduced substantially the proportions o f  recurrent 
expenditure on defence since 1968 (from almost half to  about a quarter in the latter case). 
H ow ever, under conditions o f  severe fiscal constraint (including revenue collection 
deterioration) Tanzania's savings have been used largely to  avert rises in dom estic bank 
borrow ing and have been halted by the need to  locate up to  20,000 tro o p s on its W estern 
border to  avert spillovers o f  armed violence. M ozam bique's w ere to  a degree used to  enhance 
as well as sustain health and water, but the possibility for further cuts is problem atic.
O ther countries - even Southern African ones now with no discernible external enemies - have 
lagged in m aking cuts. In the special case o f  Mali a negotiated end to  insurgency may in fact 
increase military spending because o f  the provision for recruiting insurgent ex-com batants.
Mali highlights a m ore general point. In respect to  priority peace dividend uses reconciliation 
requires that ex-com batants - from all armed groups - be provided effective access to 
education, training and livelihoods. Otherwise either recurrence o f  arm ed conflict or a 
generalised privatised version via banditry are all too  probable. A parallel priority in some 
cases is enhancem ent o f  civil police capacity because it has been very low  and because the end 
o f  wars is historically associated with a rise in crime against persons and property. In the early 
1990s, for example, excluding ceremonial/security and auxiliary traffic units these were about 
500 police for the 1,500,000 M aputo-M atula m etropolitan conurbation. The impact o f  crime 
is most severe on poor households and - therefore - poor children.
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In fact over tim e the basic peace dividend for child goal related services is likely to  be 
primarily in low er costs (up to  three quarters o f  Angola's and M ozam bique's primary schools 
and health units have been destroyed or severely damaged one or more times since 1980) and 
o f  higher household incom e and fiscal revenue growth. The related gain o f  better access to 
rural children is real but can be utilised only if  additional personnel, physical infrastructure and 
financial resources are available to  utilise it.
A second target for reallocation is domestic debt service (external is discussed below  under 
external sources). The potential lies in reduction o f  both nominal and real interest rates via 
m acroeconom ic policies reducing inflation and avoiding the monetary terrorism  o f  artificially 
high real interest rates prevailing in a number o f  African states.
The third relatively unproblem atic area for reallocation to child supporting expenditure is that 
o f  inefficient subsidies. These include support for loss making public or private  
enterprises - directly or through tax concessions - as well as special tax reductions or 
holidays not justifiable on strictly applied social or production enhancement criteria. The 
hidden subsidies via special tax concessions probably exceed the direct subsidies in a majority 
o f  countries since the latter have been falling sharply since the mid 1980s partly under IMF- 
W orld B ank-D onor pressure. In respect to  utilities there is scope for cross subsidisation - 
surpluses on piped w ater and large househpld electricity users to  reduce standpipe and 
minimum electricity charge levels. Consumer subsidies - unless carefully targeted on goods 
o f  particular im portance to low income households and actually accessible to  them  - are likely 
to  be cost inefficient although some exceptions (e.g. sugar in M orocco) do exist. Household  
producer subsidies - e.g. to farmers - are very difficult to organise in ways that make them 
accessible to  poor producers in isolated areas and may, in general, be less efficient than basic 
infrastructure and m arket access investment.
Beyond these three areas no large general potentials for reallocation out o f  existing dom estic 
budget resource exist. There are three reasons for this:
6
1. o ther elem ents in U A BS-SN A P-PPP, e.g. agricultural research and extension oriented to 
small farming households and rural roads are crucial to  children and logical part o f  the 
same strategy as child goal facilitating programmes,
2. levels o f  provision for some secondary and tertiary level services are so low - e.g. to many 
universities, research institutes and tertiary (especially teaching) hospitals - that further 
cuts would bring acute risk o f  collapse. Reducing their share o f  health or education 
spending is only feasible by expanding total spending and concentrating the additions at 
primary level;
3. expenditures which have dem onstrable revenue, production and em ploym ent gains (e.g. 
power, parts) are necessary to  provide an economic environm ent enabling UA BS-SN A P- 
PPP to be sustainable.
E f f i c i e n c y  G a i n s : G h o s t s , G r e m l i n s  a n d  G e t t i n g  t h e  J o b  D o n e
Cutting w aste and increasing efficiency are universally popular m eans to  increasing resources 
available for priority areas. The difficulties are partly in identifying substantial ones, partly in 
achieving them  and partly that in many cases enhanced efficiency (in term s o f  unit costs o f  
health, education, w ater o r nutrition services delivered) can be achieved only with higher total 
resource allocations.
Firing surplus workers is in most - not all - cases not a likely source o f  substantial savings. 
There are often 5% up to  10% surplus occupied posts at supporting and jun io r clerical levels 
accounting for 2% to  5% o f  payroll and 1% to 2% o f recurrent budgets. M ost African public 
services have risen little since 1980. Tanzania's for example peaked at 350 ,000  in the mid 
1970s and - with oscillations including 1974, mid 1980s and 1990s attritional and early 
retirement cuts o f  15,000 to  30,000 in each period - was perhaps 320 ,000  in 1995. Many are 
far too small to  provide basic services. For example, Mali's primary teachers (alm ost half o f 
all public servants) w ould have to teach nearly 200 pupils each to provide UPE.
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W here they exist, "ghost workers" (dead, retired, otherwise departed, fictitious but still paid) 
are an exception Their exorcism provided most o f  Ghana's 1980s governm ent employee cuts 
and perhaps a quarter o f  somewhat later ones in Tanzania.
Fraud and corruption reduction plus improved purchasing procedures/contract  
negotiation are potential sources o f  efficiency gains. W hether they can in fact be achieved 
turns partly on good governance and accountability, partly on availability and transparency o f  
professionally audited accounts and partly on paying public servants enough that they can 
afford to  be honest. Each can be done, none is an easy short term  rainbow leading to  a large 
crock o f  gold.
Bureaucratic procedures could reduce costs o f  delay, actions not done, com plem entary 
resources w asted (e.g. drugs and vaccines expiring in store) and senior decision takers 
clogged by petty details which should have been dealt with at field level. Contrary to  many 
critics, it is the absence o f  bureaucracy - systems to  routinise, decentralise and delegate routine 
decisions and actions to  ensure speed, consistency and correctness - which plagues most 
African governm ents. Revision or reintroduction o f  standing orders and procedural manuals 
(and o f  sanctions for acting improperly, unnecessarily referring up or simply not acting) would 
not be either very resource or time consuming. A num ber o f  medical stores procurem ent and 
distribution system s have held on to  their bureaucracies and are notably m ore efficient either 
than ones in o ther countries which have not or than de-bureaucratised units in their own 
countries.
Potentially the greatest efficiency gains in respect to  basic services (including those o f  special 
reference to  children) lies in restoring public service real emoluments. As docum ented in 
the Adedeji R eport o f  UNDP/UNICEF over half o f  primary school teachers, nurses and 
similar field level professionals are paid under a third the absolute poverty line cost o f  living 
for a household o f  six. The coping necessary to  survive by taking time away from public 
duties, taking public assets, charging generalised privatised personalised user fees and by 
corruption  render these pay levels (usually one half to one fifth those o f  com parable medium
and large enterprise posts) grossly inefficient m easured in quantity and quality o f  services 
delivered. Ethiopia has given top priority in use o f  its peace dividend to  restoring public 
service pay, professionalism and productivity, apparently with substantial initial gains. In 
education teachers pay now ranges from about tw o thirds o f  the household absolute poverty 
line to about $400 a m onth (a m odest middle class household budget) - double its previous 
level at the entry and low er levels.
Similarly lack o f  complementary resources - supplies (e.g. texts drugs, vaccines, pump 
spares) and mobility (vehicles, bicycles, spares, fuel) - greatly limits the ou tpu t in most 
education, health and w ater services. But like the efficiency gains from minimally decent pay 
levels, those o f  minimally adequate com plem entary resource provision require budget  
augmentation not reduction In the w orst cases - e.g. Tanzania, M ozam bique - a 100% or 
greater increase in the dom estic payroll or about 25%  to 30%  in the recurrent budget for 
minimum efficiency w ages and perhaps half as much for additional com plem entary resources 
would be required. W ere these to  be provided, output - with some quality weighting, e.g. 
providing needed drugs as well as consultation, learning (as m easure by com pletion rates not 
just gross enrolment - could easily double but 35%  to 50%  budget increases (rather more for 
the basic service budgets where payrolls are a larger proportion) is a daunting as well as an 
urgent target.
C o s t  S h a r i n g : U s e r  C h a r g e s , S o c i a l  S e c t o r  P a r t n e r s h i p s
The use o f  fees for basic services to  reduce the need for support from  tax revenue - or to 
broaden and improve services - has received substantial attention over the past decade, but 
with uneven results as to  net receipts and perceived service availability both physically and in 
respect to  effective access o f  poor people.
On av erag e  about 15% to 20% of primary health and education costs can be covered by
users - equivalent non salary recurrent items other than drugs and textbooks. Experience 
suggests this is achievable if  four conditions are met: first, the user funds stay at local unit 
level and are not rem itted to  the centre; second, representatives o f  users can m onitor spending
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and have a voice in unit performance more generally; third, services actually do improve, 
fourth, access to  poor households (and especially poor children) is not severely constricted.
These conditions are achievable, but only with substantially decentralised and m ore flexible 
budgetary  arrangem ents. Innovatory approaches include community provision o f  low rent 
(small tow n) o r free (rural) housing for teachers; assistance to village medical w orker 
households in grow ing food; service unit and staff housing maintenance and construction; 
paym ent for medical supplies and pump repairs on delivery (not order). On balance the 
successful cases suggest that the key gains are in greater accountability, better services 
and increased total resources with central government allocations needing to be 
absolutely increased rather than absolutely reduced The M inistry o f  Finance view o f  the 
B am ako Initiative as a means o f  cutting Treasury support for health services by unloading 
them  on poor users is unreal as well as unpropitious for universal access primary health care.
The ch ie f problem  with user fees is moral hazard, the risk o f delayed or denied service 
access. The increase in mortality in some child treatm ent program m es (e.g. Lusaka) flows 
largely from  delaying incurring costs until home treatm ent had clearly failed - too  late to  save 
life. The increase in average age o f  primary school entry in certain cases also appears to  relate 
to  higher school cash costs as well as eroded household incomes. The m ore often cited moral 
hazard  o f  excess use o f  free facilities is negligible - except perhaps for w orkplace clinics. The 
opportun ity  cost o f  travel and attendance time and the cash costs o f  drugs, books and 
uniform s are quite high enough to deter poor households (and particularly poor m others) 
w ithout added barriers.
In the cases o f  water and of secondary and tertiary services, greater possibilities for 
substantial fee revenues exist. Absence o f  public sector w ater leads to  m ajor time o f  
collection and cash (to  w ater sellers) costs. Systems o f  charging user comm unities for 
standpipe w ater can frequently cover recurrent and repair costs while still reducing user costs, 
if  u ser com m ittee collection to avoid prohibitive costs and administrative problem s can be 
m ade to  w ork. Secondary and tertiary services can reasonably - since they are not and will not
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in the foreseeable future be universal access - attract higher charges. H ow ever tw o problems 
exist: exem ptions for poor users and the economic fact that health is best paid for by 
insurance type schem es (including taxation) which place high charges at high income periods 
not at low (as do point o f  illness charges) and that whatever the d iscounted value o f  future 
earnings, secondary and higher education cannot be paid for out o f  them  now  except through 
a loan system with repayment from a surtax (added to income tax) on fu ture user incomes. 
African credit m arkets certainly are not such as to make normal loan financing practicable.
Partnership with the domestic social sector - primarily churches, m osques and women's 
groups is in many respects similar to  user fees. It has the advantage o f  existing, independent 
institutional bases to  collect from users and to identify candidates for exem ption. It may have 
problem s in respect to  coordination and maintenance o f  common minimum  standards.
Successful broad access basic service program mes by the dom estic social sector are almost all 
partnerships with state provision o f  domestic salaries and certain basic inputs (e.g. drugs, 
texts) and social sector provision o f  maintenance, salary supplem ents, som e supplies and (in 
part via their ow n external counterparts) most capital and expatriate s ta ff  costs. Christian 
services on a national basis operate on this basis in Ghana and Nam ibia in health and in 
Tanzania in health and (with less state support and weaker quality) in education and are being 
explored in M ozam bique. In these cases substantial cooperation and coordination have been 
achieved and the most serious problem o f  both sets o f  partners appears to  be limited 
resources.
W hile less highlighted, the domestic social sector - with state financial assistance - may be 
m ost effective in those areas requiring small units and personal a tten tion  for effectiveness. 
Rehabilitation program m es for street children and assistance to  poor households with personal 
in addition to  contextual (econom ic stagnation) or structural (weak hands to  w ork to  mouths 
to  feed ratio) are examples.
P a r tn e rsh ip  with enterprises is more problematic Private education and health services - 
if regulated to  avert professional malpractice and financial fraud - should usually be allowed.
But the case for supporting them financially is weak with the possible exception o f  
scholarships for specialist educational enterprises with no public or social sector alternatives. 
In the case o f  health, the private for profit sector can rarely support the overheads o f  a full 
hospital but can in principle share in them by using part o f  the facilities. In principle this is 
acceptable if  total services to non-private patients can thereby be increased. H arare's central 
hospital - now  about half financed by private users - is an example. But, in the absence o f  
hard financial analysis, a real risk exists o f  the public medical services subsidising the private 
(by definition limited to  middle and upper income clients) which should be unacceptable.
M o b i l i s i n g  M o r e  R e v e n u e  -  D o m e s t i c
D om estic revenue mobilisation can be through four main channels:
1. tax yield grow th resulting from output expansion;
2. higher tax rates o r new taxes;
3. tax reform  im proving collectability and production friendliness;
4. im proved collection o f  existing taxes at existing rates.
O ver a ten year perspective the first source is dominant. Even at 4%  G D P grow th with a 
m oderately incom e elastic tax system, a two thirds increase in tax revenue at constant prices 
is perfectly attainable. Given priority to U A BS-SN AP-PPP in g en e ra l, and to child goal 
supporting program m es in particular, at least doubling of allocations out o f  tax revenue  
should be possible. How ever, the immediate impact is low.
In m ost African cases higher rates and - especially - more different taxes would be 
counterproductive. The form er often deter production and certainly enhance evasion, while 
the latter tend to  disperse collection effort to  low yield areas with very high opportunity  costs 
in respect to  basic source collection. Exceptions exist in the case o f  adjacent countries w hose 
T reasuries are deterred from raising beer, spirits and cigarette taxes individually by realistic 
fear o f  sm uggling. Agreem ent on joint action - perhaps broadly within the frame o f  a regional
body like SADC - could in such cases yield not insubstantial revenue; perhaps m ost 
appropriately prioritised tow ard health and civil police votes given the social side results o f  the 
products taxed.
The potential gains from tax reform vary. W here no general simple dom estic indirect tax 
exists - by now  a minority situation - they are considerable. Either a single point (non 
cascade) sales tax o r a truncated (excluding sub-wholesale and retail for adm inistrative 
reasons) VAT is indicated in such cases. The same holds true o f  system s cluttered with three 
or four parallel sales (e.g. excise, sales, turnover related licence, stam p duty), incom e 
(standard, local, special, poll) and/or vehicle/road use (fuel, purchase, registration, licence) 
taxes. One SSA state prior to  a 1970 tax reform had all twelve. Am algam ation could increase 
transparency and allow m ore effective deployment o f  collection effort. O therw ise the reforms 
are likely to  be fine tuning, simplifying and reducing as often as raising rates.
In the short term  better collection o f  existing taxes at existing rates is the dom inant 
potential source o f  dom estic revenue enhancement. In many - probably a m ajority - o f  
countries, non-collected (o r at any rate non brought to account) taxes am ount to  at least 5%  
of  G DP and 25%  to 50%  o f  actual recorded collections. The conditions for claw back are 
readily identifiable and relatively simple - which is not the same as easy to  fulfil:
1. greater transparency to increase accountability and constrain large scale fraud (e.g. 
gazetting all tax exem ption or reduction orders);
2. procedural simplification and preparation o f  guidebooks for collection personnel 
combined with their training and refresher updating,
3. adequate complem entary inputs - inspection areas, vehicles with fuel and spares, 
com m unications, form s and documents;
4 p ay ing  honest wages to enable honest work, backed by ruthless prosecution o f
personnel guilty o f  corruption and transfer o f  those who clearly do not succeed in 
collecting for w hatever reason.
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»These m easures can be introduced over a year to  eighteen months if the will exists. They - 
and not separate agencies, high cost expatriates, or proposals (not yet implemented) to  pay 
collectors on a piece rate proportion o f  collections - account for dramatic turnarounds in such 
cases as G hana and Uganda
O f f i c i a l  E x t e r n a l  R e s o u r c e  R e a l l o c a t i o n  a n d  M o b i l i s a t i o n
Brutal realism suggests that net official resource transfers to Africa will not rise on a
constant price, let alone a per capita constant price, basis over the next decade. Stripping 
out expatriate salaries and disaster relief (which have been boom areas), they appear to  have 
fallen 50%  in real per capita terms since the mid 1980s. While improved economic 
perform ance could attract substantial non-concessional loan and investment inflows these can 
hardly finance child goal linked program m es o f  U A BS-SN AP-PPP directly nor - with one 
significant exception noted below - by freeing other government resources. Therefore realistic 
efforts m ust focus on reallocation and on external debt writedowns
Reallocations o f  specified use aid tow ard children, women, health, education and - less 
com m only - w ater, sanitation and small farming household supportive program m es including 
labour intensive rural infrastructure is the m ost commonly canvassed form. H ow  beneficial 
this is depends on four factors:
1. w hether there is in fact some additionality (as in UNICEF-W HO led vaccination - m other
and child - nutrition program m es there probably is);
2. the degree to  which the newly non-funded areas will need to be continued forcing reverse
reallocation o f  dom estic resources and raising o f  non-concessional loans,
3. the dom estic comm itm ent to children which can ensure that general/negotiable program m e 
support aid does go to  support child goal attainm ent,
4. the degree to  which multiple use conditionalities by multiple sources impede any rational
national budgetary process o f  resource allocation.
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Reallocation by functional category - while harder to  achieve - is probably less problematic 
if achieved. The priorities for reallocation out to  program m e or budget support are:
1. capital intensive construction - especially when labour intensive, dom estic contractor or 
community, rural income enhancem ent and safety net alternatives can be substituted;
2. emergency relief to  the extent that peace plus better domestic m anagem ent (not least 
PPP) can reduce food import requirements. However, more funding is needed for 
dom estic food procurem ent and or labour intensive work for food financing when food but 
not fiscal capacity exists nationally so that - taking Africa as a whole - SNAP gains may be 
more significant than net reallocation out o f  emergency support;
3. expatriate employm ent costs and overseas training in cases in which interim 
program m e support for viable domestic public service pay scales and dom estic training 
institution capacitation would be more cost (and capacity/accountability) efficient.
The last category is the largest. In extrem e cases (e.g. M ozam bique) such spending is up to 
seven times domestic public sector payroll and in several (e.g. Tanzania) up to  three times 
In practice much (over half in M ozam bique) o f  the expenditure goes to  replace existing 
African personnel driven out o f  the public service - or rendered less effective in it - by unfairly 
and inefficiently low pay. They therefore create - however intended - a cycle o f  short term 
capacity boosts, but a longer term  dom estic capacity, accountability and m orale decline.
E x t e r n a l  N G O  R e a l l o c a t i o n  a n d  S t r u c t u r a l  R e f o r m
External N G O  spending has risen rapidly over the last decade. It is largely focused on UABS- 
SNAP and - marginally - PPP. That is in itself welcome. However, the increased size and the 
shift to parallel channel program m es duplicating those o f  African governm ents and domestic
social sectors raise problems.
Parallel delivery systems fragment capacity and even with the best will - which does not 
always exist - make sectoral coordination difficult to  nearly impossible. The increased size
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and professionalism  o f  many NGOs in practice mean that problems o f  external dominance  
betw een them  and their local partners or clients are at least as severe as between external aid 
agencies and African governm ents. Fragmented parallel services - especially ones using 
relatively high proportions o f  expatriates - are exceedingly cost inefficient. For example in 
M ozam bique available governm ent and donor/N G O  data suggest parallel delivery health 
services cost tw ice as much as those o f  the M inistry o f  Health while providing perhaps a fifth 
the volum e o f  services.
Reallocation approaches include:
1. phasing out non-em ergency free standing parallel delivery systems. While NGOs 
specialising in free standing systems and opposed in principle to  close coordination in 
state-dom estic social sector driven national strategies - e.g. M edicines sans Frontieres 
(France) - are very valuable during wars, they should be phased out as soon as dom estic 
social sector and state services can replace them;
2. encouraging external NG Os to enter into partnership program mes as junior partners to 
dom estic social sector institutions (especially religious and wom en's organisations not just 
African professional groups modelled on N orthern NGOs). That is the route to 
capacitating the African social sector and to  making them accountable to their African 
m em bers and users in a way impossible for externally funded program m es including those 
o f  external N G O s which is now practised by a number o f  N G O s such as Christian Aid and 
C aritas/C atholic Aid,
3. exploring parallel partnership arrangem ents betw een external N G O s and local government. 
E x t e r n a l  R e s o u r c e  M o b i l i s a t i o n
The main prospects for net additions to  overall external transfers are: external debt 
w ritedow ns, non-concessional borrowing and investment, children in difficult 
circum stances, and perhaps - NGO/domestic social sector partnership programmes. Large
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across the board increases in official net transfers are m ost unlikely to  be attainable by a 
m ajority o f  African Countries
H ow ever, this cannot be taken as a reason not to put emphasis on mobilisation o f  official 
external funding. For that there are three reasons:
1. in the absence o f  effective prom otional efforts, even constant net transfer levels are 
unlikely to be achieved - minus 5%  per capita per year would be much m ore probable,
2. some African countries - usually ones with low past receipt levels - may well be able to 
increase net inflows:
3. while certain m ajor present donors - notably Japan - and possibly som e newly non-poor 
countries - e.g. Korea - are potentially willing to  raise transfers.
Mobilisation is therefore crucial and its absence will result in net falls in transfers
External debt service cost writedowns are potentially attainable, at least for up to  25 heavily 
indebted low income SSA economies. The basic formula now  backed by the W orld Bank, 
IMF, UK, Nordic Countries, N etherlands and probably USA is to  reduce future debt service 
flows to  levels consistent with 6%  growth. This is a uniform formula, contextual application 
approach which would lead to over three quarter reductions for the m ost severely debt 
impacted countries, e.g. M ozambique, Tanzania. Because different creditors prefer different 
approaches and the means to  securing parallel private creditor w ritedow ns and - in the most 
severely impacted cases - modalities and sources for financing Bank, Fund and ADB 
writedow ns are com plicated major problems remain on the road to  articulation and 
implementation but the principle has now been won a decade after it w as first proposed in a 
study for the African Association o f  Central Banks.
How ever, the gains from debt service writedown are not necessarily - indeed for the most 
severely indebted not primarily - present cash for reallocation. These countries are not in fact 
servicing all o f  their present debt. Some are servicing only Fund and Bank obliuations.
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R ather the gains are allowing forw ard planning by the countries, donors and potential 
lenders/investors free from the potential crippling impact o f  overhanging debt obligations 
which could becom e actual costs to  an uncertain extent at an unpredictable time.
Non concessional borrowing and enterprise investment is not a suitable (or indeed an 
available) source for U A BS-SN A P-PPP finance including support o f  national child 
program m es. It is likely to  be concentrated in directly productive sectors whose value to such 
priorities is indirect and m acroeconom ic through general fiscal and foreign exchange flow 
augm entation.
H ow ever, one less indirect gain is possible. W ere telecommunications, power and perhaps 
ports to be shifted to the private or joint venture sector or the public enterprises in 
them  to be enabled to borrow commercially (domestically and externally), the  
governm ent budget would be freed o f  a portion of infrastructural investment costs.
B ecause the basic activities o f  telecommunications, pow er generation and large scale 
distribution and ports can and should be surplus generating whoever carries them  out, 
en terprise ow nership and operation is plausible.
The problem s concern effective regulation (these are natural m onopolies), provision for 
socially beneficial special schemes (e.g. rural and low income urban area pow er distribution) 
and convincing financiers risk is low enough to  ensure that the capital is not prohibitively 
expensive. If  these can be overcome, the gain to  the state in being able to  concentrate 
finances (including borrow ing capacity) on U A BS-SN AP-PPP including small scale, non and 
indirectly self-financing infrastructural investment (including virtually all roads and most 
railw ays) could be substantial.
C hildren in difficult circumstances, particularly those afflicted by war, pose a challenge 
which - partly because o f  the "CNN effect" - could probably attract genuinely additional 
external financing. How ever, rehabilitation-education-economic reintegration for child 
soldiers and other war traumatised children and youths has been severely under-financed
and to  date has not been a large scale priority in peacekeeping, dem obilisation and related 
exercises.
The reasons appear to  be threefold: first, serious articulated program m es with personnel and 
resource budgets on a national scale have rarely - if ever - been draw n up, second, what might 
have been pilot schem es have usually been operated by personnel with no great interest in 
them selves generating broader countrywide proposals (and usually little tim e or finance to do 
so); third, central governm ents are probably essential as co-ordinators but, on the record, 
unlikely to  be good operators o f  such program m es because o f  the econom ies o f  small scale 
and personal contact involved. Overcom ing these barriers is not a m atter o f  financial planning 
or mobilisation, but a precondition to  having a humanly plausible, saleable package for which 
to  mobilise.
N G O  joint ventures with domestic social sector and local governm ent are a potential 
mobilisation area because some NG Os have growing own resource generation capacity and 
some governm ents are reallocating resources to  NGOs with opaque and uneven degrees o f 
control over N G O program m e selection.
Children in difllcult circumstances programmes - traum a rehabilitation, re-entry into 
education, vocational training, assistance in livelihood developm ent are an area in which 
central coordination o f  objectives, numbers, actors and funding com bined with highly 
decentralised, small, personal contact intensive operational units w ould appear optimal for 
dom estic social sector/external NGO partnerships. That suggests a national coordinating 
council linked to  dom estic social sector and local governm ent program m es supported by 
external N G O advice and technical assistance - especially for form er child com batants and 
other severely traum atised war victims and for street children - deserves serious attention. 
Return to  families is usually optimal in principle, but many families lack the resources 
(including know ledge) to  help these children and form er child soldiers are in a significant 
minority o f  cases deeply anti social and dangerous.
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A special consideration in respect to external NGOs and mobilisation is their dom estic role as 
advocates in their home countries. They do have constituencies and influences. To date their 
cam paigning - while o f  very significant importance in mobilising additional resources for 
certain top ics and countries - for example debt for SSA writedown and timely food relief in 
the 1991-93 Southern African drought and hunger crisis - has tended to  be fragm ented, 
increasingly crisis driven with a loss o f  medium term o f  developmental coherence and "a voice 
for the voiceless" rather than a voice in support o f  the voices o f  African peoples. In particular, 
few have given a sustained priority to national children's goals plans - perhaps because their 
con tac ts in the dom estic social sector have not been incorporated adequately into their 
form ulation and mobilisation. These weaknesses in large measure reflect lack o f  adequate 
assertiveness by their African partners - coordinated developmental vision and its articulated 
priorities are basically for Africans to  form ulate and unless African program m es and focused 
m essages to  assist in transm itting are put to  external NGOs their only options are to  voice 
their ow n concerns for Africa and Africans and their own criticism o f  injustices, inequities and 
insufficiencies o r - which would be much w orse - remain silent.
R a i s i n g  R e s o u r c e s : I n  R e s u m e
The main im m ediate resource gains potentials lie in:
a im proved domestic collection of existing taxes at existing rates;
b external resource reallocation away from expatriate salaries to domestic UABS-  
S N A P -P P P  priorities including plausible, efficient public service salaries.
N either m assive tax increases, reallocation from other social services nor large overall external 
resource  flow  increases are - in general - practicable. In some countries significant cuts in 
defence expenditure are attainable, while in others with low historic levels o f  aid improved 
governm ent and program m e credibility could allow additional external resource 
m obilisation as it did for Ghana after 1982 and has for Ethiopia after 1993.
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Joint program m es with the domestic social sector and community involvem ent in state 
program m es is im portant, but not as a means to  reducing existing dem ands on resources. 
These approaches can share costs, increase accountability o f  service providers to  users (who 
otherw ise won't pay), reduce costs o f  moving tow ard universal coverage and provide capacity 
for specialised, small unit, personal contact services the state is ill-adapted to  provide. 
H ow ever, to  achieve these goals will require larger than present state budgetary  contributions, 
not smaller ones because neither dom estic social sectors nor poor households have substantial 
surplus cash flows - quite the contrary.
Similar considerations apply to most efficiency gains - they can reduce unit costs but only 
on substantially larger production o f  services. Efficiency w ages and minimally adequate 
provision o f  com plem entary resources are key examples. A w ater repair artisan paid $25 a 
m onth with few spares and no fuel (thus no mobility) has near nil p roduct. W ith $60 - basic 
spares - a functioning pickup or four wheeler, he could service w ater po in ts providing pure, 
accessible w ater to  up to  100,000 people. The efficiency gains are clear - so is the prior 
requirem ent o f  - say - $1,500 to  $2,500 a year more wages, spares and fuel.
In the medium to long run - beyond five years - sustainable increases in child goal facilitating 
program m es depend primarily on sustainable grow th o f  domestic tax revenue from  sustained 
output grow th and from prioritising these additional revenues tow ard  an overall UABS- 
SN A P-PPP strategy. Trickle dow n does not work - resources w ithout prioritisation will 
not benefit poor children. But priorities without finance will not benefit them either and 
reallocation has both quantitative and temporal limits. However flawed as an all purpose 
end in itself, output and fiscal growth is an essential means to almost all priority ends 
including attainment o f  national children's programme objectives
S t e p s  F o r w a r d
These resource mobilisation and allocation proposals will not be easy to  achieve nor can all be 
won - even in substantial part - immediately. But they are vital both to  sustainable national
child goal program m es and to  the broader UA BS-SN AP-PPP strategies to  create an 
enhancing environm ent for them.
First steps are possible now Domestically these turn on improved collection o f  existing 
taxes (not least actually paying tax collectors actually to collect taxes) and building 
partnerships with the dom estic social sector - especially churches, m osques and wom en's 
groups. Internationally the immediate priorities are probably external debt w ritedow ns and 
sw itching som e aid from  expatriate salaries to  domestic programme and budget support. The 
potential for reallocation from reduced military spending ranges from high to  very low 
depending on absolute levels (including post 1990 cuts) and present genuine external security 
risks. In the longer term  sustainability turns on sustained output and revenue (household and 
social secto r as well as state) growth, achieved in a frame m acroeconom ic policy conducive to  
low inflation and low real interest rates combined with sustained reduction in requests for 
and acceptance o f  external personnel (including external NGO personnel) balanced by 
m obilising com parable Child Summit G oal-UABS-SNAP-PPP support for national 
governm ent and domestic social sector action
The initial pace may seem frustratingly slow. Given the scale and needs o f  Africa's children it 
should do so. But to  halt per capita decline in the social sector and to take first steps forw ard 
is an essential beginning. It is one some countries not all at all well o ff economically or fiscally 
have begun to  take. As the Rio Parliamentary Earth Summit put it "Any society which cannot 
care for its children cannot regard its developm ent as in any way sustainable". The corollary is 
that no society or economy which fails to achieve a rising trend in real resource and in 
fiscal revenue availability as well as in the incomes of poor households can regard its 
care for its children as in any true sense sustainable.
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PANEL X
R EVO LU TIO N AN D REFORM : Public Services and Public Servants in Ethiopia
From 1993 the new Ethiopian governm ent has focused on three civil governance goals:
1 creating a confederal inclusive nation of peoples to replace the collapsing centralised, 
exclusivist New Em pire founded by the Em peror Menelik and w arped beyond redemption 
by is descendant M engistu;
2. to  use enhanced provision of basic services as dynamic for building support for regional 
and central governm ent,
3. restoring productivity pay and professionalism of the public services to  achieve 
improved quantity and quality o f  basic service delivery.
W ith barely over 200,000 em ployees in a country o f  50,000,000 Ethiopia has a very small 
public service as well as low ratios o f  access to  basic services: under 50%  for health, about 
33%  for primary education and about 20%  for pure water. This is an historic fact with steady 
if  sluggish rises in the 1960s and early 1970s halted in the 1980s by the ruling Dergue's 
priority to sustaining itself against the Eritrean independence m ovem ent and Ethiopian 
regional insurgencies. In parallel Ethiopia was one o f  the very few countries in Africa in 
which drought in the absence o f  w ar led to  massive deaths from famine, apparently both 
because o f  perceived governm ental inability to act and blatant non prioritisation under both 
regimes preceding the present one.
Ethiopia's civil service was created late in the reign o f  the Em peror Hailie Sellasie as a 
modernising and rationalising instrument based on the late colonial/early A nglophone African 
civil service model. On technical issues and in term s o f  internal professionalism  it has been 
relatively self-governing and non politicised throughout. How ever, under the D ergue its 
morale and prestige w ere eroded because its pay scales were unchanged and annual 
ncrem ents frozen for about a quarter o f  a century leaving entry level professional pay at $20
a
and top  level under $300 in a country with an absolute poverty line household budget o f  the 
o rder o f  $60 a m onth and a modest urban middle class one o f  $400 to $500 a month.
From  1993 m ajor reform has moved ahead rapidly - instituted by political decision takers, 
articulated by senior Ethiopian public servants and financed out o f  the peace dividend resulting 
from  a three quarter cut in defence spending m ade possible by the end o f  war in a way 
allowing total demobilisation by firing o f  the defeated army and return to  form er civilian 
livelihoods o f  many members o f  the victorious one
The reform s proceeded on three fronts simultaneously:
a. re-establishing career structures - including prom otion standards and training - and a 
professional outlook;
b. setting procedural and productivity related mechanisms in place sector by sector 
(beginning with teaching;
c. restoring public service pay (to $40-450 in teaching).
The next phase includes extension o f  the procedural and productivity exercise to  all major 
public service sectors (except police which are still a branch o f  the army not o f  civil 
governance) as well as creation o f  regional and sectoral public service commissions.
The level o f  m orale is generally high both in offices in Addis and in working units in at least 
som e R egions and Districts. Field level officers are at their posts and appear to  work well 
w ith D istrict Com m ittees. Innovative approaches to  community support in rural areas and 
small tow ns centre on housing which is not readily available for rent. Small tow n community 
g roups tend to  provide low rental and village (simpler) free housing. In this they are 
responding to  a widely voiced complaint o f  rural posted personnel - lack o f  satisfactory 
housing.
The present situation and trend are distinct im provem ents but three challenges remain:
b
1 complementary supplies are very inadequate at field level - especially in w ater and 
environment;
2. in some sectors - notably soil protection and afforestation - no strategic rethinking o f  no 
longer acceptable D ergue period techniques (som etimes approxim ating forced labour) has 
been carried out, leaving both public servant and rural household enthusiasm but no 
clear operational frame,
3. while initial expansion and higher pay have been paid for from the peace dividend this has 
run out and sustained grow th depends on sustaining the 4% rate o f  growth (contrasted 
to 2%  or less trends from the 1950s to  1990 and falls in the last tw o w ar years) recently 
achieved.
Nutrition and drought impact alleviation have been transform ed analogously to  the public 
service proper. Political decision takers and senior public service quite bluntly brand famine 
deaths as cause for national shame. Response to  the 1994-95 drought w as - after some initial 
confusion - more rapid, more coordinated, more efficient in saving lives and more 
Ethiopian led than in any previous major drought period. The relative success and the 
remaining deaths are seen as cause for reassurance that re-prioritisation and reform  are on the 
right track, but still require m ore and m ore immediate professional response under more 
coordinated Ethiopian (not external parallel channel) leadership to  ensure the zero death target 
is achieved next time.
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